Series 1 Part 4: MUNICIPAL FRAUD
Municipalities Took Unlawful Control of Private Property!
Be sure to also check out Parts One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Eight and Nine of our UN INVASION of CANADA – ‘Peace Bait’ series and Parts One, Two and Three of our MUNICIPAL FRAUD series.
And now, we continue with our MUNICIPAL FRAUD content.
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Ontario Municipalities Have Taken Unlawful Control of Private Property
Language used to trick property owners
You need to know the common law legal maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ means that within a statute or regulation, when one or more things of a class are expressly mentioned, others of the same class are included but not things of a different class. To say it another way, the inclusion of one thing means the exclusion of everything else not of that class of subjects.
This is also expressed in the case law regarding what the words ‘include’, ‘including’ mean when used in a definition or legislation provision. We touched on this in an earlier section; because it is so important to understand this legal trickery, we touch on it again here before we get into the municipalities unlawful control of private property.
The power-and-revenue-generating administrators of the nation really want Canadians to misunderstand the limited scope of their Statutes and therefore have long exploited the fact that ‘includes’ is usually used by the non-lawyer in casual speech as being ‘supplemental’, as in ‘also includes’.
This is the same tactic that lawyers use, known as DOG-Latin or legalese, to trick the public with the term ‘person’, which until recently, very clearly was defined in the law dictionaries as ‘corporation, association’. Now, we see the definition of ‘natural person’, which as we showed earlier is conveniently not defined in the legislation that regulates municipalities, but is clearly in the Income Tax Act.
The common usage of ‘also includes’ usually misleads most of us presented with statutes (legislation), in which the term ‘includes’ appears.
Why are we being deliberately misled?
Contrary to common usage by non-lawyers, ‘includes’ in law is the near-equivalent of ‘means’, providing for the creation of a very narrow, specialized class to which the term being defined in the legislation exclusively applies.
Take for example –
‘person’ includes corporations, associations, societies, foundations
In law ‘includes’ is synonymous with ‘means’
‘person’ means corporations, associations, societies, foundations (EXCLUDES men, women, individuals)
The Income Tax Act, defines person and natural person, but it is not necessary for this discussion to get deeper on this language trick…we cover it in Series #2 TAXATION FRAUD and in our Series about CRIMINAL LANGUAGE.
In the example above, what follows ‘includes’ defines the narrowly specialized class that is ‘person’. That specialized class of objects (corporations, associations, societies, foundations), and other members of the broader general class of such specialized class of objects, such as co-ops and partnerships, which are not explicitly listed, share the special characteristics that distinguish the enumerated examples from all other classes of objects.
Therefore, the special class following ‘includes’ in the definition of ‘person’ embraces corporations, societies, foundations, associations, trusts, partnerships, and even groups and club organizations.
BUT, THE DEFINTION DOES NOT INCLUDE HUMAN BEINGS AS THEY ARE REAL AND THEY DO NOT SHARE THE FICTITIOUS CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REST OF THE EXAMPLES THE DEFINITION PROVIDES TO IDENTIFY THE SPECIALIZED CLASS CONTEMPLATED BY THE DEFINITION.
Get in the habit of mentally replacing the word ‘include’ with ‘means’ and you will then avoid being duped.
*** Extremely important:
Interpretation Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21)
“Definitions
General definitions
35 (1) In every enactment,Act, in respect of an Act of a legislature, includes a law of the Legislature of Yukon, of the Northwest Territories or for Nunavut;
Canada, for greater certainty, includes the internal waters of Canada and the territorial sea of Canada;
Canadian waters includes the territorial sea of Canada and the internal waters of Canada;”
You see clearly that an Act of a legislature is ONLY a law in Yukon, NWT or Nunavut, not any of the other provinces that became sovereign nation states in 1931.
In the definitions of Canada and Canadian Waters above, you see the clever use of the term ‘includes’, which automatically means to most people that Canada and Canadian Waters refer to the land and the inland and coastal waters, but that is not the case, once you understand how the word ‘includes’ limits the items in the category that follows the word ‘includes’.
Land does not share the same characteristics as water and is not in that specialized class that involves water; likewise, dogs and cats do not share the same characteristics as corporations and businesses. Dogs and cats are in a specialized class of their own. Therefore the definitions of Canada and Canadian Waters, do not include the landmass itself and obviously not human beings.
Therefore, the definition of Canada has nothing to do with land and those dwelling on the land. So, when municipal corporations start throwing their fictitious legal entity-created bylaws around, they cannot apply to live human beings on the land. To make them apply they use physical force.
Now, for the settled case decisions on the meanings and usages of the terms “Includes” and “including”--
Here’s how the United States Supreme Court explains the ‘includes’ rule:
“[T]he verb “includes” imports a general class, some of whose particular instances are those specified in the definition.” Helvering v Morgan’s, Inc, 293 U.S. 121, 126 fn. 1 (1934);
“[I]ncluding... ...connotes simply an illustrative application of the general principle.” Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 62 S.Ct. 1 U.S. (1941).
“The ordinary significance of the terms, as defined by the dictionaries, both Webster and the Standard, is “to confine within; to hold; to contain; to shut up; embrace; and involve Include or the participial form thereof, is defined to ‘comprise within’; ‘to hold’; ‘to contain’; ‘to shut up’; and synonyms are ‘contain’; ‘enclose’; ‘comprehend’; ’embrace’,”
Montillo Salt Co. v. Utah, 221 U.S 452, at 455, 466.“The term ‘includes’ and ‘including’ do not exclude things not enumerated which are in the same general class.” –27 CFR 72.11. (Emphasis added).
Here is some Canadian case law on the meaning of ‘includes’:
Statutory Interpretation - “Includes”
"In The Ontario Health Coalition v. Ontario (Minister of Long-Term Care) (Ont Divisional Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court dismissed a JR [Judicial Review], this from “the June 14, 2023 decision of the Minister of Long-Term Care (the “Minister”) to approve funding and undertake to issue a licence for a new 320 bed long-term care home in Pickering, Ontario”.
Here the court considers the specific statutory term, “includes”:[67] The OHC contends that there is no bar to the exercise of the court’s discretion to permit an unincorporated citizen group from being granted standing under Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1 (JRPA). It notes that s. 1 of the JRPA defines “party” as including “a municipality, association of employers, a trade union or council of trade unions which may be a party to any of the proceedings mentioned in subsection 2 (1)”.
[68] In my view, the definition of “party” in s. 1 of the JRPA does not assist the OHC. “[T]he word “includes” does not necessarily require an expansive interpretation extending the definition beyond the itemized list…The word “includes” may, depending on the context, precede a list that exhausts the definition”: Cochrane v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2008 ONCA 718, 92 O.R. (3d) 321, at para. 52. See also: R. v. Loblaw Groceteria Co. (Manitoba), 1960 CanLII 84 (SCC), [1961] S.C.R. 138, per Fauteux J., (concurring); Canada 3000 Inc., Re; Inter-Canadian (1991) Inc. (Trustee of), 2006 SCC 24, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 865, at paras. 47-50.
[69] As explained by Ruth Sullivan in The Construction of Statutes, 7th Ed. (LexisNexis Canada, 2022), at s. 4.04[3]:While definitions that begin with “includes” are non-exhaustive in the sense that they do not displace the ordinary meaning of the defined term and often enlarge it, they are exhaustive in the sense that, for the definition to apply, the person or thing in question must come either within the ordinary meaning of the defined term or within the meaning of the terms following “includes”.
In Toronto (City) v. Craft Kingsmen Rail Corp. (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considers the statutory interpretation of “includes”, here in a definition of real property:F. Inclusive Definition
[92] The Application Judge accepted, at para. 27, that the definition of “land” in s. 1 of the Assessment Act was an inclusive definition but concluded that what was included was limited by the examples listed in subsections (a) to (e) to something affixed to the ground. He stated, at para. 41:Everything about the definitions in s. 1, as broadened by the SCC, speaks to the relationship of something else with the ground. The broadened part of the definition is the inclusion of chattels that are on the land with some permanence but are not fixtures.
[93] This part of his analysis was, however, based on his premise that real property at common law did not include the air above the land, and, therefore, he concluded, the examples listed in s. 1 could not be used to include something that had no connection to the ground. If we reject the premise, however, the examples listed in (a) to (e) cannot be used to narrow what was already included in the common law.
[94] The word “includes” is generally used to indicate that what follows are examples rather than an exhaustive list: Sullivan, at §4.04. This is confirmed by reading s. 1 of the Assessment Act as a whole. Section 1 of the Act lists 23 definitions. Nineteen of those definitions use the word “means”, which “generally precedes a definition to be construed as exhaustive”: Canada 3000 Inc., Re; Inter-Canadian (1991) Inc. (Trustee of), 2006 SCC 24, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 865, at para. 46. Only four of the definitions in the Act use the word “includes.” In this context “includes” cannot be interpreted as limiting the definition to the itemized list.
[95] The Supreme Court of Canada and the Court of Appeal have both confirmed that the examples given in the definition were intended to expand on the common law definition. These cases do not support the proposition that there was any intention to subtract from or limit the common law definition of land or real property. See also Owners, Strata Plan para. 39.”
One never reads any piece of legislation in isolation, because they are all intertwined to form a mosaic that requires a lawyer to unpackage to get at what applies in any situation. And often, even they can’t unpackage it effectively.
To give lawyers the monopoly, the lawyers write legislation in a way that pieces of the law are all over the place and not just in one enactment.
About the value of property and how the owner’s ‘use’ of that property is what makes it ‘private’, and any interruption in that ‘use’ destroys the property itself:
Washington State Supreme Court Justice Richard B. Sanders wrote a “Fifth Amendment” treatise which included the following definition of property rights. We could not find a comparable in Canada, except for high court decisions iterating that property rights are sacrosanct.
“Property in a thing consists not merely in its ownership and possession, but in the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment, and disposal. Anything which destroys any of the elements of property to that extent, destroys the property itself. The substantial value of property lies in its use. If the right of use be denied, the value of the property is annihilated and ownership becomes a barren right” ~ Justice Richard B. Sanders 1997. Washington State Supreme Court.
“Use” of the land is the key. Using the land in a productive way beneficial to the owner is what gives the land value. Simply paying the taxes and mortgage while some undefined government entity can rule and regulate how the property is used, according to Justice Sanders, is a “barren right” that annihilates its value.”
Let’s see how the maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ applies in municipal affairs, where in Ontario, a municipality is defined as ‘a geographical area where all inhabitants are incorporated’ (of course, without their knowledge or consent).
First, let’s review what we learned earlier to see how they are applied at the municipal level:
Interpretation
1(1)“municipality” means a geographic area whose inhabitants are incorporated;
“person” includes a municipality unless the context otherwise requires;
PART II
GENERAL MUNICIPAL POWERS“Scope of powers
8 (1) The powers of a municipality under this or any other Act shall be interpreted broadly so as to confer broad authority on the municipality to enable the municipality to govern its affairs as it considers appropriate and to enhance the municipality’s ability to respond to municipal issues.”
[note: it refers to the municipality governing ITS affairs, not the private property owner’s property. This is the scope of the municipal corporation’s powers – it has power and authority ONLY to govern its own corporate affairs.]
“Powers of a natural person
9 A municipality has the capacity, rights, powers and privileges of a natural person for the purpose of exercising its authority under this or any other Act.”
[note: ‘natural person’ is not defined in the Municipal Act, 2001, but it is defined in the Income Tax Act and Black’s Law Dictionary.
Black’s Law Dictionary:
“A human being, naturally born, versus a legally-generated juridical person.
[Note: you were created by a live human being; legal entities, such as corporations, are created on paper and can be dissolved just as quickly.”]
From the the fictitious Income Tax Act of Canada:
“individual means a person other than a corporation;”
“270(1) entity means a person (other than a natural person) or a legal arrangement, such as a corporation, partnership, trust or foundation.”
Now for the biggy:
“natural person means an individual other than a trust.”
Does any individual have any right on another’s private property? NO!
So, when the Municipal Act, 2001 states that a municipality has the powers of a natural person, the municipality can run ITS affairs like an individual, but only ITS affairs, not a private property owner’s affairs.
Does a municipality have any authority to enter and undertake any work on private property without the owner’s permission? If another individual doesn’t then the municipality being the equivalent of an individual, NO!
May we tease you again at this point with something important from the Income Tax Act that we discuss in detail in Series #2 TAXATION FRAUD?
Income Tax Act
“taxpayer has the meaning assigned by subsection 248(1), but does not include a natural person or a partnership.”
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Provincial Law Limits Municipality Control over Private Property
The main provincial enactments that outline the powers and authority of municipalities, as well as what they do not have are the --
Municipal Act, 2001
Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, Chapter P.13 Consolidation Period: From
June 5, 2025 to the e-Laws currency date
More Homes Built Faster Act, 2022
Ontario Regulation 384/94 Apartments in Houses
Additional Residential Units, O Reg 299/19
Planning Act, 1990 limitations on municipal control of private property:
“Interpretation:
“parcel of urban residential land” means a parcel of land that is within an area of settlement on which residential use, other than ancillary residential use, is permitted by by-law and that is served by,
(a) sewage works within the meaning of the Ontario Water Resources Act that are owned by,
(i) a municipality,
(ii) a municipal service board established under the Municipal Act, 2001,
(iii) a city board established under the City of Toronto Act, 2006,
(iv) a corporation established under sections 9, 10 and 11 of the Municipal Act, 2001 in accordance with section 203 of that Act, or
(v) a corporation established under sections 7 and 8 of the City of Toronto Act, 2006 in accordance with sections 148 and 154 of that Act, and
(b) a municipal drinking water system within the meaning of the Safe Drinking Water Act, 2002;
“public body” means a municipality, a local board, a hospital as defined in section 1 of the Public Hospitals Act, a ministry, department, board, commission, agency or official of a provincial or federal government or a First Nation;
“public work” means any improvement of a structural nature or other undertaking that is within the jurisdiction of the council of a municipality or a local board;
“residential unit” means a unit that,
(a) consists of a self-contained set of rooms located in a building or structure,
(b) is used or intended for use as residential premises, and
(c) contains kitchen and bathroom facilities that are intended for the use of the unit only.
PART V
LAND USE CONTROLS AND RELATED ADMINISTRATIONDemolition control area
33 (1) In this section,
“dwelling unit” means any property that is used or designed for use as a domestic establishment in which one or more persons may sleep and prepare and serve meals;
“residential property” means a building that contains one or more dwelling units, but does not include subordinate or accessory buildings the use of which is incidental to the use of the main building.
Acquisition and disposition of non-conforming lands
34 (8) The council may acquire any land, building or structure used or erected for a purpose that does not conform with a by-law passed under this section and any vacant land having a frontage or depth less than the minimum established for the erection of a building or structure in the defined area in which such land is situate, and the council may dispose of any of such land, building or structure or may exchange any of such land for other land within the municipality.
Restriction, parking facilities
34 (1.1) Despite paragraph 6 of subsection (1), a zoning by-law may not require an owner or occupant of a building or structure to provide and maintain parking facilities, other than parking facilities for bicycles, on land that is not part of a highway and that is located within,
(a) a protected major transit station identified in accordance with subsection 16 (15) or (16);
(b) an area delineated in the official plan of the municipality surrounding and including an existing or planned higher order transit station or stop, within which area the official plan policies identify the minimum number of residents and jobs, collectively, per hectare that are planned to be accommodated, but only if those policies are required to be included in the official plan to conform with a provincial plan or be consistent with a policy statement issued under subsection 3 (1); or
(c) any other area prescribed for the purposes of clause 16 (22) (c).
Provisions of no effect
(1.2) A provision of a by-law passed under this section or an order made under clause 47 (1) (a) is of no effect to the extent that it contravenes a restriction described in subsection (1.1) of this section.
Same
(1.3) Despite paragraph 6 of subsection (1), a zoning by-law may not require an owner or occupant of a building or structure to provide and maintain parking facilities, other than parking facilities for bicycles, containing more than the number of parking spaces prescribed for the purposes of subsection 16 (24) on land that is not part of a highway and that is located within an area prescribed for the purposes of that subsection, and if a by-law does so, the by-law is deemed to be amended to be consistent with this subsection.
Same, transition
(1.6) Despite any subsequent changes to a minimum setback distance as a result of any changes to a percentage prescribed for the purposes of subsection (1.4), the minimum setback distance in respect of a building or structure is deemed to be the minimum setback distance on the day,
(a) a permit is issued under subsection 8 (1) of the Building Code Act, 1992, in respect of the building or structure, where the permit was not revoked under subsection 8 (10) of that Act; or
(b) the lawful use of the building or structure was established, in the case of a building or structure in respect of which no building permit was required.
Excepted lands and buildings(9) No by-law passed under this section applies,
(a) to prevent the use of any land, building or structure for any purpose prohibited by the by-law if such land, building or structure was lawfully used for such purpose on the day of the passing of the by-law, so long as it continues to be used for that purpose; or
(b) to prevent the erection or use for a purpose prohibited by the by-law of any building or structure for which a permit has been issued under subsection 8 (1) of the Building Code Act, 1992, prior to the day of the passing of the by-law, so long as the building or structure when erected is used and continues to be used for the purpose for which it was erected and provided the permit has not been revoked under subsection 8 (10) of that Act.
By-law may be amended(10) Despite any other provision of this section, any by-law passed under this section or a predecessor of this section may be amended so as to permit the extension or enlargement of any land, building or structure used for any purpose prohibited by the by-law if such land, building or structure continues to be used in the same manner and for the same purpose as it was used on the day such by-law was passed.
(10.0.0.1), (10.0.0.2) Repealed: 2022, c. 21, Sched. 9, s. 8 (1).
Non-application, residential units(1.3) A by-law passed under this section does not apply to the erection or location of,
(a) a second residential unit in a detached house, semi-detached house or rowhouse on a parcel of land on which residential use, other than ancillary residential use, is permitted, if all buildings and structures ancillary to the detached house, semi-detached house or rowhouse cumulatively contain no more than one residential unit;
(b) a third residential unit in a detached house, semi-detached house or rowhouse on a parcel of land on which residential use, other than ancillary residential use, is permitted, if no building or structure ancillary to the detached house, semi-detached house or rowhouse contains any residential units; or
(c) one residential unit in a building or structure ancillary to a detached house, semi-detached house or rowhouse on a parcel of land, if the detached house, semi-detached house or rowhouse contains no more than two residential units and no other building or structure ancillary to the detached house, semi-detached house or rowhouse contains any residential units. 2022, c. 21, Sched. 9, s. 12 (5); 2023, c. 10, Sched. 6, s. 10.
Transition – residential units76 (1) If on November 16, 1995, a detached house, semi-detached house or row house was used or occupied as two residential units, section 1, subsections 16 (2), (3) and (4), 31 (3.1) and (3.2), 35 (1), (3) and (4) and 51 (28), (29) and (30) of this Act and Ontario Regulation 384/94, as they read on November 15, 1995, continue to apply to that house.
Same
(2) Section 1, subsections 16 (2), (3) and (4), 31 (3.1) and (3.2), 35 (1), (3) and (4) and 51 (28), (29) and (30) of this Act and Ontario Regulation 384/94, as they read on November 15, 1995, continue to apply to a detached house, a semi-detached house or a row house if on or before the day on which subsection 20 (1) of the Land Use Planning and Protection Act, 1996 comes into force,
(a) a permit has been issued under section 8 or 10 of the Building Code Act permitting the erection, alteration, occupancy or use of the house for two residential units; and
(b) the building permit has not been revoked under section 8 of the Building Code Act.
Municipal Act, 2001 limitations on municipal control of private property:
By-laws
10(2) A single-tier municipality may pass by-laws respecting the following matters:
4. Public assets of the municipality acquired for the purpose of exercising its authority under this or any other Act.
11(2) A lower-tier municipality and an upper-tier municipality may pass by-laws, subject to the rules set out in subsection (4), respecting the following matters:
4. Public assets of the municipality acquired for the purpose of exercising its authority under this or any other Act.
[note: the Municipal Act, 2001 specifically refers to public property acquired by the municipality, that is, that it owns, and NOT to private property and things it does not own.]
Let’s look at two other provisions respecting by-laws and what municipalities can do with their bylaws:
Services or things provided by others
10(4) The power of a municipality to pass a by-law respecting the matter set out in paragraph 7 of subsection (2) does not include the power to pass a by-law respecting services or things provided by a person other than the municipality or a municipal service board of the municipality.
Services or things provided by others
11(6) The power of a municipality to pass a by-law respecting the matter set out in paragraph 7 of subsection (2) does not include the power to pass a by-law respecting services or things provided by a person other than the municipality or a municipal service board of the municipality.”
[note: so bylaws cannot be passed regarding services or things not provided by the municipality]
[Summary: just as does any other ‘natural person’ the municipal corporation has authority only over what it owns, being public assets that it ACQUIRED, and no authority over services/things that it is not providing, confirming that municipalities’ scope of power is over its own corporate affairs and what it specifically owns, not over what private individuals own.]
We can see the application of the maxim we opened this section with within the Municipal Act, 2002 and its Regulations. Clearly public property is specifically included, and private property is specifically excluded from the Municipal Corporations control.
To further drive home the point that a municipal corporation’s power, authority and control over property and affairs is limited to its own property and affairs - just as a natural person’s control is limited to their own property and affairs - private property is NEVER included anywhere in the relevant legislation, and therefore the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies.
The municipal corporation’s power, authority and control is limited only to public property it owns, and not to private property.
To clarify this point further because it is so important, remember our discussion in Part 3 about Section 9 of the Municipal Act, 2001 regarding municipal right and powers
Section 9 of the Municipal Act, clearly states that the municipality only has:
‘the Powers of a natural person: A municipality has the capacity, rights, powers and privileges of a natural person for the purpose of exercising its authority under this or any other Act.
What natural person/individual do you know that could impose anything on another’s private property? None, as such an attempt would be ‘trespassing’. Because the municipality has no more power than a natural person/individual/man or woman, then it also has no power or authority to impose on private property and things the municipality does not own. The municipal corporation’s affairs are restricted to property it owns, not private property owned by natural persons/individuals/men and women.
Municipalities use corrupt Judges and force to make private property owners succumb to their fraudulent bylaws, policies, plans and eventually make the frightened public believe they do have all the power they say they have over private property they don’t own. Stating that municipal corporations are lawless is an understatement. In fact, they behave exactly like a mafia, taking over entire communities, and imposing their own ‘rules’ that always violate the superior domestic laws of the land.
There is yet another way within the Municipal Act, 2001 that the common law maxim we opened this section with is confirmed as being applied:
“Powers of a natural person [our note: natural person means individual]
9 A municipality has the capacity, rights, powers and privileges of a natural person for the purpose of exercising its authority under this or any other Act.”
[note: its authority over its affairs and its property, not your affairs and private property]
“Powers exercised by by-law
5(3) A municipal power, including a municipality’s capacity, rights, powers and privileges under section 9, shall be exercised by by-law unless the municipality is specifically authorized to do otherwise.”
[note: taking these two provisions together, the power the municipality has is strictly over ITS affairs and when it does exercise that power, it’s by by-law. Nothing there says it has the power to exercise any power over private property, and definitely not by bylaw.]
[to repeat: the municipality has the power, privilege, capacity and rights of an individual/natural person, OVER ITS AFFAIRS, just as would any private individual property owner. A natural person/individual DOES NOT HAVE ANY AUTHORITY OVER PRIVATE PROPERTY THEY DO NOT OWN, or have specific over as an agent or leasee.]
As you can see, a municipal corporation cannot give itself, using bylaws, authority they never got from the superior provincial legislation in the first place. Thus, they do indirectly, by force, misrepresentation and lawfare, what they cannot do directly.
And it gets better: the province can’t give any authority or power to a lower government (municipal corporation) that the province does not itself have!
Summary: Municipal Corporation powers exercised under by-laws therefore have no power, no authority and no control over private property which the Municipal Corporation does not own. If the municipality did own it, it would not be ‘private property’; it would be public property.
The Municipal Corporation cannot give itself more power or authority than what was granted by statute from the Province. And the Province cannot grant power or authority to the Municipal Corporation over something that it does not have to give.
Case Law in Support of the above limitations of municipalities over private property:
Are you wondering if there is case law for these statements? Yes! There is lots of case law, some here –
Ontario (Attorney General) v. Rowntree Beach Assn., 1994 CanLII 7228 (ON SC)
“… and that Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario has no right, title or interest in and to the lands described …“
[our note: of course not because in 1931, the British Crown cut the province loose to be a sovereign nation state]
The Great West Saddlery Company Limited and others v. The King [1921] UKPC 27, [1921] AC 91 (25 February 1921), Privy Council (on appeal from Canada); on page 100 it says:
“What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.“
R. v. Greenbaum, [1993] 1 SCR 674, 1993 CanLII 166 (SCC)
“Municipalities are entirely the creatures of provincial statutes and can therefore exercise only those powers which are explicitly conferred on them by provincial statute. A court should look to the purpose and wording of the provincial enabling legislation when deciding whether or not a municipality has been empowered to pass a certain by-law. The by-laws themselves are to be read to fit within the parameters of the empowering provincial statute where they are susceptible to more than one interpretation. Courts must be vigilant, however, in ensuring that municipalities do not impinge upon the civil or common law rights of citizens in passing ultra vires by-laws.”
Noble v. Township of Brantford 1963, 2 OR 393-401, Ontario High Court of Justice
“The first and most obvious limitation is found in the limitations imposed upon the power of the Province itself by the B.N.A. Act. The Province has not itself universal power of legislation, and its creature the municipality can have no higher power.”
Attorney General for British Columbia and Minister of Lands v. Brooks-Bidlake and Whitall Ltd 63 SCR 466 1922, heard by Judge Idington:
“… the right of an owner to deal with the lands belonging to him or it, as to such owner may seem fit …”
O’Donohue v. Canada, 2003 CanLII 41404 (ON SCCOURT FILE NO.: 01-CV-217147CM DATE: 20030626
“[15] … It is well settled that the Charter cannot be used to amend or trump another part of our constitution …”
— End of Series 1 Part 4 MUNICIPAL FRAUD —
In our next MUNICIPAL FRAUD newsletter, we will continue looking at ways that provincial law, criminal law, common law and case law limit a municipality’s power and authority over private property.
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